Post by dodger on Aug 1, 2013 17:54:09 GMT
Splendid survey of the outcomes of Britain's war in Afghanistan, 1 Aug 2013
This William Podmore review is from: Investment in Blood: The True Cost of Britain's Afghan War (Hardcover)
Frank Ledwidge is a former naval reserve military intelligence officer who served on the front line in the Balkan wars and Iraq, and was a justice advisor for the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan's Helmand province. He is the author of the outstanding book Losing small wars: British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This war has cost Britain more lives (444 as of 9 July 2013) and more money than any post-1945 war except Korea, more lives than any counter-insurgency war since the Boer War. 2,600 soldiers have been wounded and more than 5,000 psychologically injured. The cost of Britain's war casualties is at least £4 billion, but the state displaces the costs of caring for veterans onto charities.
Prime Minister Blair decided in 2005 that British forces should take responsibility for Helmand, which is the size of Bosnia. Helmand was largely peaceful before British forces arrived in 2006. Since then, at least 3,000 civilians have been killed, at least 542 by British or NATO forces. Thousands have been wounded and left disabled, and tens of thousands forced to flee their homes.
The army keeps no records of civilian casualties, despite its claims that its mission is to protect civilians. Many civilian deaths go unreported, like the 25, including nine women and three babies, killed by an air strike in June 2007, only revealed by journalist Ben Anderson, and the eight killed by an air strike in July 2010, only revealed by Wikileaks. Compare this with the care and attention given to British soldier deaths. Ledwidge concludes that as far as the British army is concerned, "an Afghan life (or indeed many Afghan lives) is not worth one British life. The horrendous irony of this is that, as we have seen, one of the supposed tenets of the so-called `counterinsurgency' tactic is `protection of the people'."
Since 2006, no government has told us how much the war costs. The British ambassador there estimated in 2010 that it cost Britain £6 billion a year. Ledwidge estimates the total so far as £31.1 billion. The war has cost the `international community' (that is, the G7) $900 billion.
The war's aims were, supposedly, to establish security in Afghanistan, to enable development, and to make us safe here in Britain. But security is worse, development is virtually non-existent, and 7/7 still happened.
We had spent £950 million on development projects by early 2013, and another £1 billion is to be spent by 2015. Yet Afghanistan is 181st of 182 countries in human development and it still produces 85 per cent of the world's heroin.
No Afghan has ever threatened our safety. Not one Afghan has ever been involved in any terror attack in Europe or the USA.
Anatol Lieven, an expert on Pakistan, pointed out, "What we can surely say is that UK policy has been an absolute disaster in the perception of the Muslim population and has produced a significantly increased terrorist threat." So, as he observed, "The real front line against terrorism in the UK is in the UK." Ledwidge comments, "That is surely incontrovertible in the light of the July 2005 bombings in London and subsequent attempted attacks, many of them mounted by UK citizens of Pakistani origin."
Like the USA in Vietnam, British forces won the battles and lost the war. A senior British officer believed that Helmand was `the decisive campaign of the whole war' - possibly, but not in the sense he meant. It was a strategic fiasco. Blair has the sadim (reverse Midas) touch - everything he touches turns to dross. By 2010, the US embassy had concluded that Britain's forces were `not up to the task' of securing Helmand. Canada, the Netherlands and France have already, wisely, withdrawn their forces.
Some in Britain's political and military leadership cannot admit that they got it wrong; they think that `cracking on', one more push, and we'll win. But this just reinforces failure.
Ledwidge claims that this `is the last imperial war'. We very much hope so, but Foreign Secretary Hague's efforts to make war on Syria suggest that it will not be.
The author cites General Sir Richard Dannatt, head of the British army at the time, who said in 2009: "there is recognition that our national and military reputation and credibility, unfairly or not, have been called into question at several levels in the eyes of our most important ally as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign. Taking steps to restore this credibility will be pivotal - and Afghanistan provides an opportunity."
Ledwidge sums up, "The so-called `special relationship' has led Britain into the invasion of two Islamic countries. Her confused and inconsistent strategy (or the lack of any strategy) in the ensuing wars and her over-enthusiastic and totally uncritical following of US policy have been intensely damaging to British (and indeed Afghan) interests. The policies pursued have been entirely counterproductive and literally self-defeating." He concludes that we need to make our defence forces and strategy serve our national interests, not the USA's national interests.
This William Podmore review is from: Investment in Blood: The True Cost of Britain's Afghan War (Hardcover)
Frank Ledwidge is a former naval reserve military intelligence officer who served on the front line in the Balkan wars and Iraq, and was a justice advisor for the Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan's Helmand province. He is the author of the outstanding book Losing small wars: British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan.
This war has cost Britain more lives (444 as of 9 July 2013) and more money than any post-1945 war except Korea, more lives than any counter-insurgency war since the Boer War. 2,600 soldiers have been wounded and more than 5,000 psychologically injured. The cost of Britain's war casualties is at least £4 billion, but the state displaces the costs of caring for veterans onto charities.
Prime Minister Blair decided in 2005 that British forces should take responsibility for Helmand, which is the size of Bosnia. Helmand was largely peaceful before British forces arrived in 2006. Since then, at least 3,000 civilians have been killed, at least 542 by British or NATO forces. Thousands have been wounded and left disabled, and tens of thousands forced to flee their homes.
The army keeps no records of civilian casualties, despite its claims that its mission is to protect civilians. Many civilian deaths go unreported, like the 25, including nine women and three babies, killed by an air strike in June 2007, only revealed by journalist Ben Anderson, and the eight killed by an air strike in July 2010, only revealed by Wikileaks. Compare this with the care and attention given to British soldier deaths. Ledwidge concludes that as far as the British army is concerned, "an Afghan life (or indeed many Afghan lives) is not worth one British life. The horrendous irony of this is that, as we have seen, one of the supposed tenets of the so-called `counterinsurgency' tactic is `protection of the people'."
Since 2006, no government has told us how much the war costs. The British ambassador there estimated in 2010 that it cost Britain £6 billion a year. Ledwidge estimates the total so far as £31.1 billion. The war has cost the `international community' (that is, the G7) $900 billion.
The war's aims were, supposedly, to establish security in Afghanistan, to enable development, and to make us safe here in Britain. But security is worse, development is virtually non-existent, and 7/7 still happened.
We had spent £950 million on development projects by early 2013, and another £1 billion is to be spent by 2015. Yet Afghanistan is 181st of 182 countries in human development and it still produces 85 per cent of the world's heroin.
No Afghan has ever threatened our safety. Not one Afghan has ever been involved in any terror attack in Europe or the USA.
Anatol Lieven, an expert on Pakistan, pointed out, "What we can surely say is that UK policy has been an absolute disaster in the perception of the Muslim population and has produced a significantly increased terrorist threat." So, as he observed, "The real front line against terrorism in the UK is in the UK." Ledwidge comments, "That is surely incontrovertible in the light of the July 2005 bombings in London and subsequent attempted attacks, many of them mounted by UK citizens of Pakistani origin."
Like the USA in Vietnam, British forces won the battles and lost the war. A senior British officer believed that Helmand was `the decisive campaign of the whole war' - possibly, but not in the sense he meant. It was a strategic fiasco. Blair has the sadim (reverse Midas) touch - everything he touches turns to dross. By 2010, the US embassy had concluded that Britain's forces were `not up to the task' of securing Helmand. Canada, the Netherlands and France have already, wisely, withdrawn their forces.
Some in Britain's political and military leadership cannot admit that they got it wrong; they think that `cracking on', one more push, and we'll win. But this just reinforces failure.
Ledwidge claims that this `is the last imperial war'. We very much hope so, but Foreign Secretary Hague's efforts to make war on Syria suggest that it will not be.
The author cites General Sir Richard Dannatt, head of the British army at the time, who said in 2009: "there is recognition that our national and military reputation and credibility, unfairly or not, have been called into question at several levels in the eyes of our most important ally as a result of some aspects of the Iraq campaign. Taking steps to restore this credibility will be pivotal - and Afghanistan provides an opportunity."
Ledwidge sums up, "The so-called `special relationship' has led Britain into the invasion of two Islamic countries. Her confused and inconsistent strategy (or the lack of any strategy) in the ensuing wars and her over-enthusiastic and totally uncritical following of US policy have been intensely damaging to British (and indeed Afghan) interests. The policies pursued have been entirely counterproductive and literally self-defeating." He concludes that we need to make our defence forces and strategy serve our national interests, not the USA's national interests.